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International Terrorism in 1979

A Research Paper

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International Terrorism in 1979


Overview

Most patterns of international terrorist behavior recorded in 1978 continued into 1979: attacks on diplomatic and business facilities, simplicity in operations, and a preference for targets in industrialized democracies. The number of attacks declined worldwide, however, as did the number and proportion of attacks against US citizens.

Several terrorist groups stepped up their operations, however, to publicize their respective causes. Intergovernmental cooperation in combating terrorism was spearheaded by a West European agreement on extradition and prosecution and by the passage of a UN convention against the taking of hostages.

Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks* 1968-79

Figure 1



*Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents.

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International Terrorism in 1979

Trends

For the year as a whole, there was a decrease in the number of international terrorist incidents (see table 1, page 14 and figure 2). There has been, however, no noncommittant decrease in casualties from international terrorist attacks (see figure 1). These attacks caused more deaths and more casualties in 1979 than during any previous year since we began keeping statistics in 1968.

The proportion of terrorist incidents apparently aimed at causing casualties—most notably assassination attempts—increased, while incendiary bombings, which generally involve only property damage, fell from second to sixth place in frequency among terrorist attacks. This change in targeting patterns accounts in part for the rise in casualties and deaths. As has been noted in our previous surveys, most terrorist incidents are not intended to cause casualties, and only one-fourth of all attacks between 1968 and 1979 resulted in casualties.¹

Terrorists continue to prefer operations in the industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North America (see figure 3). Nearly half of all incidents were recorded in Western Europe alone, both by indigenous organizations and by groups that have chosen to export their grievances. Perhaps due in part to increased governmental countermeasures, terrorism in Latin America and the Middle East has lagged far below the levels recorded in 1978.


There have been fewer attacks than the previous year (see table 2, page 14) on US citizens and property in both relative and absolute terms, but many more Americans were killed this year than before. At least 12 Americans—including an ambassador—represent-

¹ Of the 353 international terrorist incidents recorded in 1978, 62 incidents (17.1 percent) involved deaths and 57 (16.1 percent) involved injuries. Of the 293 incidents recorded in 1979, 64 (21.8 percent) involved deaths and 71 (24.2 percent) involved injuries. While these proportions are slightly up over 1978 figures, the dramatic increase in total casualties appears to be accounted for by more casualties per incident than in 1978.

International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-79

Figure 2

Total Incidents: 3,336



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ing diplomatic, military, business, and private interest (in Afghanistan, Rhodesia, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey), were victims of anti-US attacks.² Infrequent though deadly operations appear to have replaced the formerly more common firebombings of American vehicles.


Officials and businessmen—especially individuals who are symbols of Western power and wealth—are still the primary targets (see figure 4). Tourists and other private citizens are victimized only incidentally (for example, as passengers on a hijacked airliner). West

² This figure does not include political violence by domestic groups within the United States against American citizens.

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-79

Total: 3,336

Figure 3



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
European nationals were victimized in 47 percent of all reported incidents; North Americans were the second most frequent targets. Among US victims, businessmen continued to be the most numerous, although the absolute number of attacks against corporations has dramatically decreased. Attacks against American diplomatic installations—fueled by false rumors of US orchestration of the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca—increased at year's end.

Despite the publicity given to occasional sophisticated operations, most terrorist attacks continue to be simple in conception and operation (see table 6, page 16). Bombings remained by far the most preferred type of attacks, accounting for nearly 40 percent of all terrorist operations. Despite preboarding security precautions that made the smuggling of weapons on board airliners highly improbable, aerial hijackers have discovered that pilots generally assume that their claims of being armed are true and have thus acquiesced to their demands. Hence, although few

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks Directed Against US Targets, 1968-79

Total: 1,348

Figure 4



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hijackers have been armed, hijackings—by terrorists and nonterrorists—have increased somewhat over 1978 totals.

Fortunes of Major Groups³

Western Europe. The Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, as well as the Irish National Liberation Army, has generated substantial international publicity with several major operations during the year, particularly those aimed at symbols of the British Government and the Crown.

They assassinated Airey Neave, would-be Conservative Secretary for Northern Ireland; Sir Richard Sykes, Ambassador to the Netherlands; and Lord Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family. The IRA also continued to inflict mass casualties, injuring 18 persons in a bombing in Brussels and killing at least 18 soldiers and wounding another eight in an ambush near the Irish border at Warrenpoint.

³ Coverage of this topic necessarily touches on acts of domestic as well as international terrorism involving these groups.

According to a recent British Army assessment of the IRA, the group has adopted a more clandestine cellular structure, making it much more difficult to combat. While this reorganization has increased the clandestine security of IRA units and thus permitted successful major operations without leaks to the authorities, compartmentation may lead to operational errors. Many observers believed the IRA's successful assassination of a Belgian banker and the near-successful assassination attempt on SHAPE Commander Alexander Haig were both cases of mistaken identity. The IRA's Christmas letterbombing campaign against prominent Britons failed when the group mailed their deadly packages to the wrong addresses. Despite popular outcry in the wake of these attacks, and a papal plea for a cease-fire, IRA operations are expected to continue to be successful in the near term.


On the European continent, the ETA, a Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organization in Spain, met with successes similar to those of the IRA. Factions of the group assassinated several important military officials, leading to increased pressures on the government to adopt repressive measures that the ETA believes would result in increased popular support for an independent Basque state.

Hoping to combat French-Spanish cooperation against Basque terrorists who slip across the border, the ETA temporarily declared war on French business and tourist interests in Spain. They conducted a vigorous bombing campaign which in one weekend claimed five deaths and 113 injuries at an airport and two rail stations. Spanish rightists, despairing of a firm governmental response to this wave of terrorism, conducted a series of vigilante raids against Basque leaders in France. Despite the positive outcome of the 25 October referendum on Basque autonomy, some members of the ETA have vowed to continue to use terrorism to press for complete independence.

Spanish authorities suffered a setback when five members of Spain's other major terrorist group, the Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1 (GRAPO), tunneled to freedom from a prison in Zamora. Earlier in the year the group was apparently planning to kidnap a high-ranking US military official.

Nationality of Victims of International Terrorist Attacks,* 1968-79

Figure 5



*The percentage of the total number of incidents around the world appears under the total number of incidents involving victims from that region. Percentages sum to more than 100 due to incidents in which victims were from several regions.

1979 proportions are represented by red sections of bars.

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West German terrorists had a second consecutive unsuccessful year, failing to carry out any major actions and presumably conducting only some support activities, such as robbing banks and maintaining hideouts. The Red Army Faction was one of several groups that claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt against General Haig. Police discovered several terrorist safe houses and arrested several well-known terrorist leaders, which will significantly hamper terrorist planning and operational capabilities.

Terrorism by both the left and the right in Turkey resulted in an average of four deaths per day, despite the imposition of martial law in several provinces and increased pressure by the military on the new government for more effective measures. The leftist Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front was responsible for most of the seven assassinations of US citizens in Turkey last year. On the international front, Armenian exiles, still seeking revenge for Turkish massacres in 1915, expanded the range of their targets. Whereas they had previously attacked only Turkish personnel and facilities, numerous non-Turkish airline offices were bombed throughout Western Europe by individuals claiming to belong to Armenian organizations.

In Italy, there were some noteworthy police successes against the major groups. Individuals believed responsible for the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro in 1978 were arrested in Italy and France. Other individuals responsible for major rightwing terrorist attacks were detained in Latin America during the year. Fissures within the Red Brigade, Italy's well-known leftist terrorist group, appeared to be growing, as its factions carried an ideological battle of words in the country's newspapers.

Despite such reverses, Italian terrorists do not seem to have been operationally hampered, and terrorist attacks continue at their record-setting rate. Some operations showed particular daring; the Front Line's seizure of 200 hostages at a Turin business school ended with 10 of the victims being shot in the leg. Such raids led the Italian Government to institute several stern measures to aid antiterrorist efforts.

Middle East. Anti-US sentiment in Iran reached a peak in 1979 with the second takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran. Beyond its unique political

ramifications this takeover also differed operationally from previous barricade and hostage episodes in several ways. Usually, the environment around the site is hostile to the terrorist; in Tehran, the captors had the support of the host government in defiance of all rules of customary and codified international legal practice. After the takeover, security forces, acting in concert with the terrorists, guarded the hostages and restricted communications. Rather than actively negotiating for the release of the hostages, government authorities reinforced the demands of the terrorists. Outside Iran, the few planned terrorist attacks in support of this operation were thwarted by police.

The seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca led Saudi Government officials to reexamine the extent of the threat posed by domestic dissidents, including their foreign contacts and organizational capabilities. Several attacks on US facilities were made by Muslims who believed the charges of US involvement in the Mecca attack. These incidents do not appear to have been orchestrated by any government or organization as part of a coordinated campaign.

Disunity continues to beleaguer the Palestinian movement. Several radical Arab governments have taken advantage of these differences by sponsoring guerrilla organizations to further their own ends. Bickering within and among organizations has thus in part prevented Arab terrorist attacks from reaching the levels of the early 1970s. Moreover, radical Arab governments have realized that their previous extensive support of Palestinian terrorism often proved counterproductive in their dealings with the West. At least for the time being, there has been a notable decline in government patronage of international terrorist attacks.

Fatah held off international terrorist activity pending the outcome of Yasir Arafat's diplomatic offensive to obtain Western recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Moreover, Fatah's ability to conduct international terrorist exploits was restricted by the assassination in Beirut in January of Ali Hassan Salameh, reputed planner of Black September's attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics.

Saiqa, a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian group that had not conducted any international terrorist attacks since 1973, made headlines through a series of attacks under the name of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, a fictitious name used to mask Saiqa's attacks against Egyptian interests in Europe and the Middle East. Its most spectacular operation was the takeover of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. After the takeover ended, Turkish authorities granted permission for the opening of a PLO office in Ankara, reputedly in return for PLO mediation with the terrorists. Saiqa's terrorist activities were halted, if only temporarily, with the assassination in France of its leader, Zuhayr Muhsin.

Other Palestinian groups met with similar mixed success. The Black March Organization, believed by some observers to be either the Black September Organization or a cover name for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), underscored its opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty with a bloody attack on the Brussels airport.⁴ West German authorities thwarted possible similar operations by arresting several would-be Palestinian terrorists entering West Germany in late April.

Latin America. Several Salvadoran leftist formations conducted the most noteworthy international terrorist operations in Latin America. They seized several foreign embassies and private installations, assassinated several diplomats and businessmen and kidnaped others, including Americans, Britons, and the South African Ambassador to El Salvador. These organizations hope to be as successful as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in toppling the government.

Terrorism farther south has been virtually halted in some countries because of aggressive crackdowns by police forces. Although Argentine terrorists have

⁴ The PFLP has decreased its international terrorist operations since the 1978 death of its foreign operations chief, Wadi Haddad. The organization has apparently been unable to replace him with an individual with similar organizational and governmental contacts or terrorist planning skills. However, one of the PFLP's most infamous operatives, Venezuelan-born Carlos, recently surfaced for the first time since he led the 1975 raid on an OPEC summit to tell the press that he would return to prominence.

suffered massive losses, the Montoneros showed a continued capability for at least sporadically mounting dramatic incidents. And there were continuing indications that bilateral cooperative arrangements exist among some Latin American terrorists.

Antiterrorist Countermeasures

Businesses continue to search for defensive methods tailored to their own needs. Several multinational corporations preferred to comply with terrorist ransom and publicity demands rather than cooperate in government-declared "no concessions" policies. Many consultative organizations were formed solely to advise executives on how to cope with political violence. Others conduct ransom negotiations and payoffs as part of the services offered to their kidnap insurance customers.

The growing popularity of these insurance policies increases the likelihood that terrorist kidnapers will achieve their monetary goals. These ransoms will, in turn, fund further terrorist operations. Hence, while kidnap insurance increases the chances of a victim being freed safely, its existence is counterproductive in the long run, defeating deterrence policies.

Regional cooperation against terrorism was especially evident among European countries. In May, police chiefs of 17 major West European cities met to discuss means to combat terrorism and other violent crimes. In December, members of the European Community signed a convention designed to resolve some technical legal difficulties in implementing the Council of Europe's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The latest convention calls for extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of certain offenses—including hijacking, kidnaping, use of bombs and automatic firearms, and attacks on diplomats—whatever the motivation. The agreement will come into effect when all nine members of the EC have passed necessary ratification legislation.

Cross-regional antiterrorist cooperation—most notably between Western Europe and Israel—nearly backfired. Palestinians charged that West Germany permitted an Israeli intelligence officer to question an

Arab guerrilla arrested trying to smuggle explosives into West Germany last April. The PLO claimed that Israel later forced the guerrilla to attempt to assassinate a prominent Fatah leader, but that the Arab committed suicide instead. The PLO threatened to scuttle its quiet working relationship with West Germany, while more radical Palestinians vowed to take more drastic retaliatory measures. These threats—as well as those directed against the United States for initially granting Israel's request for the extradition of an Arab accused of bombing an Israeli marketplace—did not result in terrorist attacks.

Even certain Communist regimes expressed some interest in cooperating with the West in combating terrorism. China, for example, supported the UN convention on hostages, and Cuba renewed its antihijacking agreements with Canada and Venezuela for another five years. After all, Communist states were not entirely immune to terrorist threats. The Soviets abroad continued to be attacked by militant Jewish groups and anti-Communist Cuban exiles. Soviet official and commercial facilities more recently have been bombed by Ukrainian exiles and individuals protesting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The most notable attempt to combat terrorism on a global scale was the UN General Assembly's adoption by consensus of an international convention against the taking of hostages. The convention, which had been in various UN committees for three years, calls for states to prosecute or extradite hostage-takers without exception whatsoever. Language on the rights of national liberation movements, the right of asylum, and the Geneva conventions and protocols on the law of war was included to allow for greater support of the final document. The convention was opened for signature on 18 December and will come into effect when 22 states have ratified it.

Several nations joined the three international conventions on crimes against aviation, as well as the UN convention on internationally protected persons. The new round of demarches by the supporters of these agreements is likely to add further to the list of adherents.

Outlook

Although individual terrorist attacks rely heavily upon the element of surprise, general patterns of terrorist behavior have proven to be predictable. Although there will be several discontinuities, we expect that a number of trends from the 1970s will carry over into the next year:

- While the statistical decreases in the number of terrorist incidents that we have noted are at first impression encouraging, the decline may be only temporary. Terrorist incidents have shown a two-year cyclic pattern during the 1970s, with 1979 predicted as a valley. Several terrorist groups may have been improving operational security and sophistication, recruiting and training new members, and merely waiting out government dragnets. This would allow them to better adapt to government countermeasures, thus increasing the likelihood of more frequent—and occasionally more sophisticated—attacks in the future.
- The increase in casualties and casualty-producing incidents—particularly in light of the notable rise of assassinations—is especially alarming. Although operations deliberately intended to result in mass casualties have been rare, terrorists may believe that a larger number of casualties are now necessary to generate the amount of publicity formerly evoked by less bloody operations.
- The vast majority of incidents will continue to be simple in conception and implementation, posing little risk to the perpetrators. Although added security precautions at sensitive facilities, a business exodus from unstable areas, and paramilitary rescue squads may deter spectacular attacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all potential—if less sensitive—targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
- Regional patterns of victimization and location of operations are likely to remain virtually unchanged. Representatives of affluent countries, particularly government officials and business executives, will remain attractive targets. Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East again are likely to be

the main trouble spots. Americans and US property will continue to be attacked on occasion, although improvements in US official and corporate security should deter many potential attacks by small bands.


New developments expected in the coming year include the following:

- Terrorists will try to adapt their tactics to neutralize the countermeasures adopted by government and private security services. They probably will change target selection, improve planning and trade craft, and, possibly, increase their technological sophistication.
- West German terrorists, having suffered reverses during the past two years, are likely to feel greater pressure to renew their revolutionary credentials by engaging in operations at home or overseas. As has been the case with the PFLP, however, losses of major leaders—through arrest, death, or retirement—has severely cut back their operational capabilities.
- New groups, motivated by hitherto unpublicized goals, are likely to emerge. One such movement may already have come to light in Syria, where Soviets have been attacked for their actions in Afghanistan. Other groups may be formed due to the recent upsurge in nationalism and ethnic consciousness. Improvements in the general level of education and affluence had generally been believed to vitiate parochialism. In several areas, however, such improvements are generating a historical consciousness that results in the pursuit of narrower and more traditional loyalties, such as ethnic and religious ties. Often that pursuit will produce violence both within and across state boundaries.
- The support of terrorists by patron states has become more selective than it had been in previous years, due to almost uniformly unfavorable publicity, diplomatic repercussions, and the inability to control such operations. The recent unwillingness to provide overt aid may be reversed if states do not perceive that their interests are being served by more conventional means; nonetheless, it is more likely that cost-effectiveness will become the determinant of whether to support terrorists.

International Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-79

Figure 6

Total: 3,336



1. Includes hijacking of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous non-terrorist hijackings.

2. Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

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Appendix A

Interpreting Statistics on International Terrorism

This study uses computerized data based solely on unclassified material published since 1968. While this technique promotes a historical and comparative perspective, the tallies should be treated with caution. This appendix explains the conceptual and analytical issues involved in the development and maintenance of the data set upon which these statistics are based.

Competing Research Methods

Several research approaches have been used in attempts to examine forms of terrorism systematically. One technique is to review the literature of terrorism, focusing on the philosophies of guerrilla theorists and practitioners. While this may yield an idea of possible motivations, such an inquiry is limited only to those groups that have chosen to leave a printed legacy. We might attempt to solve this difficulty by interviewing practicing, jailed, or retired terrorists.¹ Problems of access, as well as reliability of testimony, cast doubt on the utility and practicability of such an approach. Additionally, the terrorist may be unaware of why he really behaves as he does, and interviewing could become an exercise in mutual distortion.

Our research has attempted to deal with these problems by supplementing these methods with an events data approach, which has been employed more generally in academic studies of the structure of the international system. Rather than focusing on individual actors or terrorist groups, such an approach deals with the discrete incident as the unit of analysis. This approach allows us to examine actual behavior, rather than statements by observers and practitioners about such behavior.

¹ The clandestine nature of terrorism, personal predispositions and institutional affiliations of most researchers will continue to limit this area of inquiry to the domain of the courageous handful. Other researchers, however, may profitably attempt to use such data in constructing long-range secondary psychiatric profiles of specific individuals. Care must always be taken, however, to ensure that the terrorist is not using the researcher as another medium of propaganda transmission.

Although the data are collected on individual incidents, descriptive statistics allow us to aggregate these events and investigate long-term trends in terrorist campaigns. This leads to general conclusions about what terrorists do, how they go about it, and where they are most likely to strike. Furthermore, noting the structural characteristics of the incident provides us with an indication of the boundaries within which terrorists operate. Physical, temporal, and self-imposed constraints upon terrorist behavior establish the parameters of their activities. From observing the choices terrorists make within these limits, we can attempt to infer motivations and compare the terrorists' stated rationale for their actions with their target selection. Ideally, knowledge of the range of options open to the terrorists, as well as their most likely choices, can lead to potentially effective counter-measures.

Structural Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents

We have found that intelligence analysis plays several roles in aiding policymakers charged with coping with specific incidents of terrorism. For example, establishing general patterns of terrorist behavior from overt data, while useful in planning protective strategies, must be supplemented with specific tactical data regarding the terrorist group conducting the operation, evidence of what terrorists in similar situations have done, and estimates concerning how this group is likely to react to several possible government responses. To organize our information to meet these needs, we break down our data into a number of categories, related generally to a sequence of phases through which most incidents proceed.

The first phase, common to all incidents, is the *preincident* period, in which the terrorist is planning the operation. This period may include acquisition of operational intelligence through surveillance, informants, and penetrations of the target by agents of

the group. The group is simultaneously obtaining operational paraphernalia, such as arms, documents, disguises, transportation, and other equipment. After planning the operation, training often takes place. This is followed by movement to the scene of the attack. During this period, those aiming at countering the terrorists will concentrate their resources on intelligence operations designed to detect and thereby thwart the group's plans.

The second phase, again common to all incidents, is the *initiation* of the attack, which varies from emplacing a bomb to taking hostages. Compared to the first phase, which can last for months, this phase is measured in seconds or minutes. Those needing intelligence support are the security forces at the scene.

The *negotiation* phase, which is limited to incidents involving the seizure of symbols (usually human) deemed of value to a third party, can range from a matter of hours in most barricade-and-hostage scenarios to years in some marathon kidnappings. Here the intelligence analyst serves the negotiator, who may be a trained psychologist/psychiatrist, government official, individual of symbolic value to the terrorists, or a third-party intermediary.

The *climax* signals the ending of the incident. In some cases, it may be nearly identical in time to the initiation of the incident (for example, a thrown bomb explodes). Those who depend upon intelligence now can include the intermediary from the previous phase, the security forces from phase two, or an armed rescue squad formed to secure the release of the hostages in case negotiations break down.

The *postincident* period closes the description of an event and often brings us full circle to the planning phase for the next incident. Those requiring data and analysis include hospitals and psychiatrists who care for the victims, as well as court systems to handle the proper disposition of the offenders. In this phase, as well as all of the others, government/business policymakers are involved in developing a comprehensive response plan.


The news media, as well as educators, are similarly involved at every step of the incident.

During this sequence, we are most interested in understanding the dynamic relationships between actors and how these interactions can be manipulated to lead to a favorable resolution of the crisis. Our definition of terrorism allows us to identify five major types of actors according to their type and extent of involvement in the incident: terrorists, victims, hosts, targets, and audiences. In many incidents, a given nation-state may assume several of these roles. For example, a country could be a terrorist "breeder" (that is, the home country of the terrorist), as well as provide the location of the attack (host) and be the target of the demands forwarded by the terrorist. Figure 7 sketches a few of the relationships between these actors which might be manipulated, and for which data are readily available.

Further complicating the situation—although allowing additional opportunities for intervention leading to the episode's resolution—are secondary actors. Three subtypes of ancillary actors can be established according to their attitudes toward the nonterrorist actors: malevolent, neutral, or benign. Figure 8 depicts the types of relationships between primary and secondary actors for which we collect information.

Malevolent ancillaries may be other terrorist groups or sympathetic patron states, who provide varying degrees of aid to the terrorist groups before, during, and/or after the event. Such actors may also direct propaganda to specified audiences in support of the terrorists' actions. Some events have also included a third party adding demands to those forwarded by the perpetrator of the incident.

The neutral third party most often mediates between the terrorist and the target. The target may also request the neutral's aid in implementing various face-saving solutions to the incident, such as granting safe



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
haven to the perpetrators at the conclusion of an incident or publishing a terrorist manifesto. The neutral, as well as benign ancillaries, may also choose to grant humanitarian assistance to victims. In addition, the benign ancillary may provide technical assistance to the target in the form of intelligence and security information, equipment, or manpower for dealing with the crisis.

Data Collection and Cataloguing

To construct the categories for our data set, we surveyed academic literature and government policy-makers to identify variables considered relevant to the description of each incident phase and actor. To

establish the feasibility of treating incidents quantitatively, this list was treated as preliminary, and only a few sources were employed.

Among the difficulties we initially encountered were the issue of defining terrorism, its international variants, and what constitutes a separate incident. How one emerges from these definitional complexities will affect what is included in the data compilation and, therefore, the substantive conclusions. For example, Risks International's mixing of international and domestic incidents yields a once-interrupted constant rise in terrorism during the 1970s, whereas our



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statistics on only international incidents yields a two-year cyclic pattern during the same period.² A Rand Corporation compilation treated a wave of 40 bombings by one group during one night in the same city as

² Adding foreign local incidents to our data would enormously inflate our statistics. For example, casualty figures for Turkey alone in the 1970s frequently equal or surpass our annual casualty statistics for international attacks. More than 2,000 people have died in terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland since 1969.

The criteria used in the present study are unavoidably arbitrary. The statistics exclude terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations during the Indochina conflict. They also exclude the assassinations and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, unless those incidents either victimized non-combatant nationals of states outside the principal area of conflict or became the object of international controversy. The figures also exclude bombings, shellings, and incursions by conventional forces. Related but separately targeted actions undertaken by a single terrorist group are counted as individual incidents, even when they were staged on the same day and in close proximity to one another. Terrorist operations that miscarried (as opposed to those that were abandoned or countered during the planning or staging phases) are counted.

one incident, whereas we logged 40 incidents in this case. The inflationary or deflationary effects of these differing coding conventions are readily apparent.

Increasing the number of sources gives more information on more incidents and fills in missing data on each incident, but it does not necessarily solve problems of erroneous information and conflicting information among sources. Such distortion may result from deliberate falsification or underreporting of data by any of the participants involved in the incident. Governments may seek to establish a favorable image for themselves (as do terrorists). Corporations, on the other hand, tend to remain silent on threats and attacks against their facilities because of insurance and goodwill considerations as well as the fear of unfavorable host government intervention during clandestine

ransom negotiations and payoffs. Firms may also have been intimidated into silence by the terrorists' threat of retaliatory attacks.

Errors in reporting by the press and broadcast news media are generally unintentional, due to a "fog of war" that prevails during crisis situations. Unfortunately, terrorist incidents are rarely the subjects of followup press articles which would correct these initial errors. The analyst must determine the credibility of reports by noting access of the source to given details, previous reporting reliability, and possible ulterior motives in distorting, selectively reporting, or falsifying information.

Other problems in coding remain. Subtle biases may be introduced by relying too heavily on variables that require judgmental, rather than enumerative, distinctions. Statistical checks and partial corrections for these errors are available in certain cases but can make analysis and interpretation of results cumbersome. Attribution of terrorist purpose, for example, proved to be generally unreliable in the pilot data set and was subsequently dropped. In addition, incidents that have many of the outward manifestations of terrorist events, such as "quasi-terroristic" criminal or psychopathic attacks, may tend to contaminate the data set if included.

Current Status

After discovering these problems in the preliminary compilation, a second data set has been created which we believe adequately deals with these issues. The current data set includes more sources and has refined the variables. Several variables were deleted because of lack of data (for example, purpose of attack, age of terrorists), their unreliable judgmental nature (for example, degree of discrimination in selection of victim), or lack of discriminable (that is, minimal variance) data. The benefits of including some variables did not justify their data collection costs; these variables were also dropped. New variables have been added based on suggestions made by academic and governmental users of the pilot data set (for example, several variables on the legal issues involved

in the adjudication of the terrorist incident). In addition, the numeric data set is now divided into four separate files (general, hijack, hostage, terrorist fate), resulting in a substantial savings in core storage and statistical package flexibility.

A textual description of each incident is now also available and can be used to create specialized chronologies of incidents with common characteristics, for example, a chronology of attacks against US diplomatic facilities. Intercoder reliability has been substantially improved, because of the nonjudgmental nature of most of the variables, greater care in making coding distinctions explicit in the codebook, and increased supervision by the project director of the coders' work.

This appendix is Unclassified.

Table 1**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-79**

Location	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
North America	35	7	23	24	18	18	38	51	37	23	19	25	318 (11.4)
Latin America	41	71	113	70	49	80	124	48	105	46	61	53	861 (25.8)
Western Europe	16	31	58	38	112	141	151	109	179	129	166	137	1,267 (38.0)
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	3	15 (0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	7	8	4	4	4	9	18	16	20	24	10	124 (3.7)
Middle East and North Africa	18	32	60	52	35	21	47	56	62	48	61	39	531 (15.9)
Asia	1	12	19	24	43	10	11	13	14	8	16	26	197 (5.9)
Oceania	0	5	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	19 (0.5)
Transregional	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.1)
Total	111	166	282	216	269	275	382	297	413	279	353	293	3,336

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 2**International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Target**

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	273 (20.3)
Military officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	204 (15.1)
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	217 (16.1)
Business facilities or executives	6	35	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	487 (36.2)
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	166 (12.3)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	122	77	1,347

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 3

**International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	3	32	17	11	37	25	38	30	22	27	20	263 (7.9)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	5	1	3	8	9	14	4	5	11	13	73 (2.2)
Letter bombing	3	4	3	1	92	22	16	3	11	2	5	24	186 (5.5)
Incendiary bombing	12	22	53	30	15	31	37	20	91	57	69	19	456 (13.7)
Explosive bombing	67	97	104	115	106	136	239	169	176	131	133	115	1,588 (47.6)
Armed attack	11	13	8	8	9	10	21	11	21	14	36	26	188 (5.5)
Hijacking ²	3	11	21	9	14	6	8	4	6	8	2	8	100 (3.0)
Assassination	7	4	16	12	10	18	12	20	48	23	29	47	246 (7.4)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	1	0	8	8	5	0	12	2	78 (2.3)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	4	3	3	9	14	6	9	8	71 (2.1)
Other actions ³	1	3	11	10	4	4	4	1	7	11	20	11	87 (2.6)

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 4

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Trans-regional	Total
Kidnaping	3	144	25	0	40	34	15	2	0	263
Barricade-hostage	6	19	24	0	2	19	3	0	0	73
Letter bombing	15	9	100	0	14	7	37	0	4	186
Incendiary bombing	30	72	256	3	4	53	34	4	0	456
Explosive bombing	214	403	641	8	12	250	48	12	0	1,552
Armed attack	3	37	38	1	23	62	24	0	0	188
Hijacking ¹	6	23	19	1	7	28	16	0	0	100
Assassination	17	62	94	0	20	38	14	1	0	246
Theft, break-in	3	45	14	0	0	14	2	0	0	78
Sniping	12	32	9	1	1	13	3	0	0	71
Other actions ²	9	15	47	1	1	13	1	0	0	87
Total	318	861	1,267	15	124	531	197	19	4	3,336

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 5

**International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	2	17	9	2	20	8	20	7	4	5	5	100 (7.4)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	0	3	16 (1.2)
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	12 (0.9)
Incendiary bombing	12	18	40	26	13	19	25	4	36	24	49	39	275 (20.4)
Explosive bombing	30	58	77	93	73	52	90	63	44	35	40	38	693 (51.4)
Armed attack	1	4	3	4	6	6	5	3	8	3	11	7	61 (4.5)
Hijacking ²	0	4	12	3	4	0	0	2	5	4	0	1	35 (2.6)
Assassination	3	2	9	2	2	3	2	7	13	5	6	9	63 (4.7)
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	0	0	3	3	1	0	8	0	41 (3.0)
Sniping	2	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	5	4	3	3	31 (2.3)
Other actions ³	0	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	21 (1.6)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	123	77	1,348

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 6

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1979, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	1	11	2	0	1	1	4	20
Barricade-hostage	0	8	1	0	0	4	0	13
Letter bombing	1	0	22	0	0	1	0	24
Incendiary bombing	1	3	7	1	0	1	6	19
Explosive bombing	16	15	66	1	2	13	2	115
Armed attack	1	4	4	0	2	4	11	26
Hijacking ¹	1	1	0	1	0	4	1	8
Assassination	2	6	25	0	5	7	2	47
Theft, break-in	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Sniping	1	4	1	0	0	2	0	8
Other ²	1	0	8	0	0	2	0	11
Total	25	53	137	3	10	39	26	293

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 7

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks
on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Total
Kidnaping	0	61	1	0	14	20	4	0	100
Barricade-hostage	3	3	1	0	0	8	1	0	16
Letter bombing	3	2	1	0	2	0	4	0	12
Incendiary bombing	6	61	131	1	3	42	27	4	275
Explosive bombing	77	267	186	0	4	118	38	3	693
Armed attack	0	19	12	0	3	17	10	0	61
Hijacking ¹	6	5	11	0	0	3	10	0	35
Assassination	3	23	11	0	6	14	6	0	63
Theft, break-in	0	28	5	0	0	7	0	0	41
Sniping	0	16	4	1	0	7	3	0	31
Other actions ²	1	7	3	1	0	8	1	0	21
Total	99	492	366	3	32	244	105	7	1,348

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 8

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks
on US Citizens or Property, 1979, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	5
Barricade-hostage	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Letter bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incendiary bombing	0	1	1	0	0	1	6	9
Explosive bombing	12	10	12	0	0	2	2	38
Armed attack	0	2	0	0	0	3	2	7
Hijacking ¹	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Assassination	1	0	6	0	1	0	1	9
Theft, break-in	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sniping	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
Other ²	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total	15	18	21	0	1	10	12	77

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Appendix B

Names and Acronyms Used by Groups Claiming Responsibility for International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-1979

This list includes names of non-US organizations responsible either by claim or attribution for specific international terrorist actions noted in our statistics. The inclusion of any given group should not be interpreted as an evaluation of that organization's goals or motives. Some groups that began as violent organizations may have changed their ideology and tactics or may have disbanded with their members joining other groups. Some attacks may have been carried out without the approval, or even foreknowledge, of that organization's leaders. In still other cases, claims of responsibility may be falsely made by opponents of the organization who are attempting to discredit their enemies.

Many of the groups listed are cover names for organizations wishing to deny responsibility for a particular action that may yield counterproductive results. Some names may have been used by common criminals to throw off police investigators or by psychotics seeking public recognition. No attempt has been made to pierce these covers, and the names provided by the claimants have been accepted.

The list is organized according to the probable nationality of the terrorists or, when ambiguous, by the terrorists' area of operations. This list does not include US organizations that have claimed responsibility for attacks against foreigners on US soil.

Groups With Indeterminate Nationality

Che Guevara Brigade
International Che Guevara Organization
International Revolutionary Front
Islamic Liberation Organization
Moslem International Guerrillas
VFVP LBF (expansion unknown)

Western Hemisphere

Argentina

Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA)
Argentine Liberation Front (FAL)
Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO)
Argentine National Social Front
Argentine Youth for Sovereignty
Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialista
Descamisados Peronistas Montoneros
ERP-August 22
Frente de Liberacion Nacional del Vietnam del Sur
Maximo Mena Command
Montoneros
Movimiento Peronista
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)

Bolivia

National Liberation Army (ELN)
Nationalist Commando

Brazil

Action for National Liberation (ALN)
Armed Revolutionary Vanguard-Palmares (VAR-Palmares)
Aurora Maria Nacimiento Furtado Command
Revolutionary Movement of the 8th (MR-8)
Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR)

Canada

Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ)

Chile

Chilean Socialist Party
Proletarian Action Group
Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR)

Colombia

Group of Revolutionary Commandos-Operation
Argimiro Gabaldon
Invisible Ones
Military Liberation Front of Colombia
Movement of the 19th (M-19)
National Liberation Armed Forces
National Liberation Army (ELN)
People's Revolutionary Army-Zero Point
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
Red Flag
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Workers Party
September 14 Workers Self-Defense Command
United Front for Guerrilla Action

Costa Rica

Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity
Roberto Santucho Revolutionary Group

Cuba

Abdala
Alpha 66
Anti-Castro Commando
Anti-Communist Commandos
Brigade 2506
Condor
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
(CORU)
Cuba Action
Cuba Action Commandos
Cuban Anti-Communist League
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuban Liberation Front
Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Cuban Power (el Poder Cubano)
Cuban Power 76
Cuban Representation in Exile
Cuban Revolutionary Directorate
Cuban Revolutionary Organization
Cuban Youth Group
International Secret Revolutionary United Cells
JCN (expansion unknown)
Latin American Anti-Communist Army
Movement of Cuban Justice
Movement of the Seventh (M-7)
National Integration Front (FIN; Cuban Nationalist
Front)

Omega 7

Pedro Luis Boitel Command
Pedro Ruiz Botero Commandos
Pragmatistas
Scorpion (el Alacran)
Second Front of Escambray
Secret Anti-Castro Cuban Army
Secret Cuban Government
Secret Hand Organization
Secret Organization Zero
Young Cubans
Youths of the Star

Dominican Republic

Dominican Popular Movement (MDP)
Twelfth of January Liberation Movement
United Anti-Reelection Command

El Salvador

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
Faribundo Marti Liberation Labor Forces (FPL;
Popular Liberation Forces)
February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
(PRTC)
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
White Warriors Union (UGB)

Guatemala

Guatemalan Anti-Salvadoran Liberating Action
Guerrillas (GALGAS)
Guatemalan Nationalist Commando
National League for the Protection of Guatemala
National Liberation Movement
Peoples Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR; PGT/FAR;
Rebel Armed Forces)
Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13)

Guyana

People's Temple

Haiti

Coalition of National Liberation Brigades
Haitian Coalition

Mexico

Armed Communist League
Armed Vanguard of the Proletariat
Mexican People's Revolutionary Army
People's Armed Command
People's Liberation Army
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FRAP)
23rd of September Communist League
United Popular Liberation Army of America

Nicaragua

Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN)

Paraguay

Political Military Organization
Popular Colorado Movement (MoPoCo, dissident
faction of Colorado Party)

Peru

Armed Nationalist Movement Organization (MANO)
Condor
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
MTR (expansion unknown)
Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAP)
Revolutionary Vanguard

Uruguay

Armed Popular Front (FAP)
National Liberation Movement (MLN; Tupamaros)
Organization of the Popular Revolutionary-33
(OPR-33)
PCU (expansion unknown)
Raul Sendic International Brigade

Europe

Albania

Anti-Communist Military Council

Austria

Justice Guerrilla

Belgium

Julien Lahaut Brigade
Revenge and Freedom

Cyprus

Enosis Movement (EOKA-B)
National Patriotic Front M.P. 14/31

France

Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
Andreas Baader Commando
Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the
Zionist Presence in France
Avengers
Charles Martel Group
Committee for Socialist Revolutionary Unity
Committee of Coordination
Group for the Defense of Europe
International Revolutionary Solidarity
International Solidarity
Jewish Self-Defense Front
Masada Action and Defense Movement
Movement of Youthward Brothers in War of the
Palestinian People
New Order
Organization Delta
Red Army Faction of Southern France
6th of March Group
Solidarity Resistance Front
Talion Law
We Must Do Something
Youth Action Group

Greece

Army Officers Representing the Free Greek Spirit
ELA (expansion unknown)
Free Greeks
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)
Greek Militant Resistance
Greek People
Independence-Liberation-Resistance (AAA)
National Youth Resistance Organization
Organization of November 17
Patriotic Front
Peoples Resistance Organized Army
Popular Liberation Organized Army
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group-11 (LAOS 11)
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group Number 13
(LAOS Number 13)
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group People Number
One (LAOS People Number One)
Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group
Union of Officers Struggling for the National Idea

Italy

Armed Communist Formations
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)
Armed Proletarian Power
Autonomous Workers Movement
Black Order (Ordine Nero)
Combatants for Communism
Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better Justice
Proletarian Internationalism
Proletarian Justice
Proletarian Squad
Red Brigades (BR)
Red Guerrilla
Revolutionary Action Group

Netherlands

Red Brigades
Revolutionary Peoples Resistance of the Netherlands

Portugal

Action Group for Communism
ARA (expansion unknown)
Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement
Portuguese Liberation Army
Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity

Spain

Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1 (GRAPO)
Basque Nation and Freedom (ETA; Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna)
Commando of Solidarity with Euzkadi
Hammer and Sickle Cooperative
Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL)
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)
Juan Paredes Manot International Brigade
Nationalist Intervention Group
Popular Revolutionary Armed Front (FRAP)
Spanish Armed Groups
Spanish National Association
Warriors of Christ the King

Sweden

B-26 (expansion unknown)

Switzerland

Les Beliers de Jura
Petra Kraus Group

Turkey

Acilciler
Armenian Liberation Army
Avengers of the Armenian Genocide
Front for the Liberation of Armenia
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
Justice of Armenian Genocide
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)
Mayir Cayan Suicide Group
New Armenian Resistance Group
Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia (Secret Armenian Liberation Army; SALA)
Slave Kortin Yanikiyan Group
Turkish Peoples Liberation Army (TPLA)
Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front (TPLP/F)
Turkish Revolutionaries
Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation
28 May Armenian Organization
Yanikian Commandos

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

October 15 Commando

United Kingdom/Ireland

Black Liberation Army
Irish Freedom Fighters
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish Republican Army-Provisional Wing (IRA-Provos)
Red Flag 74
Sinn Fein
Ulster Defense Association (UDA)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Young Militants

West Germany

Andreas Baader Commando of the Red Army Faction
Baader Solidarity Group
German Liberation Popular Front, Andreas Baader Brigade
Holger Meins Brigade
Holger Meins Kommando, Revolutionary Cell
International Anti-Terror Organization
Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando
Red Army Faction (RAF; Baader-Meinhof Gang; BMG)
Revolutionary Cell Brigade Ulrike Meinhof
Robert E. D. Straker Commando of the Territorial Resistance Army

Second of June Movement
Socialist Patients Collective
Ulrike Meinhof Commando

Yugoslavia

Croatian Intelligence Service
Croatian National Liberation Forces-Fighters for a
Free Croatia
Croatian National Resistance
Freedom for the Serbian Fatherland (SOPO)
Trotskyist Organization
Young Croatian Army for Freedom
Young Croatian Republican Army

Africa

Angola

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA)

Cabinda

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC)

Canary Islands

Canary Islands Independence Movement
Canary Islands Intelligence Service
Movement for Self-Determination and Independence
for the Canary Islands (MPAIAC)

Chad

Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT)

Djibouti

National Independence Union (UNI)
Popular Liberation Movement
Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS)

Ethiopia

Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
ELF-General Command
ELF-Revolutionary Council
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)
Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)

Mozambique

Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
Mozambique Revolutionary Council (COREMO)

Rhodesia

Patriotic Front (PF)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)

Somalia

Somali Liberation Front

Spanish Sahara

Mustafa el Wali Bayyid Sayed International Brigade
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)

Zaire

Peoples Army of the Oppressed in Zaire (APOZA)
Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)

Asia

Afghanistan

Afghan Islamic Society
Afghan National Liberation Front
Afghan National Liberation Movement
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Bangladesh

National Socialist Party (JDS)

Burma

Kachin Independence Army

India

Ananda Marg
Kashmiri Liberation Front
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Front

Indonesia

Darul Islam Holy War Command
Free South Moluccan Youth Organization
Front for the Liberation of Aceh-Sumatra

Japan

Anti-Japan Armed Front of East Asia
 Japanese Red Army (JRA; Arab Red Army; Army of the Red Star)
 Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)
 Okinawa Liberation League
 Red Army Faction (Sekigun-ha; United Red Army)
 VZ 58

Philippines

Kabataang Makabayan
 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
 Peoples Revolutionary Front

Taiwan

People's Liberation Front
 World United Formosans for Independence

Thailand

Pattani Liberation Front

Middle East and Northern Africa**Algeria**

Soldier of the Algerian Opposition
 United Liberation Front of New Algeria

Iran

Fedayeen
 Forghan
 Iranian Peoples Strugglers (IPS; Mujahiddin e Khalq)
 Iranian Students Association (ISA)
 Moslem Liberation Front
 National Front Forces of Iran
 Reza Rezai International Brigades

Iraq

Free Iraq

Israel

Wrath of God

Jordan

Jordanian Free Officers Movement
 Jordanian National Liberation Movement

Lebanon

Imam As-Sadr Brigades
 Lebanese Revolutionary Guard
 Lebanese Revolutionary Socialist Movement
 Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization (Shibbu Gang)
 Phalange
 Phalangist Security Group
 Revolutionary Arab Youth Organization
 Socialist Labor Party
 Standard Bearers of Imam Musa As-Sadr Organization

Oman

Peoples Liberation Army

Palestine

Abdel Nasser Movement
 Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP)
 Arab Communist Organization (CAO)
 Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
 Arab People (Ash-Shab al-'Arabi)
 Arab Revolutionary Army-Palestinian Commando
 Arab Revolutionary Movement
 Arm of the Arab Revolution
 Black June Organization (BJO)
 Black March Organization
 Black September-June
 Black September Organization (BSO)
 Commando Muhammed Boudia
 Correct Course of Fatah (Al-Khat as-Sahih Lifatah)
 Eagles of the Palestine Revolution (EPR; Red Eagles)
 Fatah
 Friends of the Arabs
 Ghassan Kanafani Commandos
 Group of the Fallen Abd al Kadir al Husayni
 Mount Carmel Martyrs
 National Organization of Arab Youth
 Nationalist Youth Group for the Liberation of Palestine
 Organization of Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYOLP)
 Organization for the Victims of Zionist Occupation
 Organization of the Struggle Against World Imperialism (SAWIO)
 Organization of Avenging Palestinian Youth
 Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories

Organization of the Sons of Palestine
Organization of Victims of Occupied Territories
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Palestine Rejection Front
Palestine Revolutionary Forces
Palestine Revolutionary Movement
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
PFLP-General Command
PFLP-Special Operations
Punishment Squad (al Icab)
Rejection Front of Stateless Palestinian Arabs
Saiqa (Thunderbolt)
Seventh Suicide Squad
Sons of the Occupied Land
Squad of the Martyr Patrick Arguello

Saudi Arabia

Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula
(UPAP)

Yemen

Eagles of National Unity